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1  Introduction
To explore what being human in a hyperconnected reality could mean, we may 
start with Hannah Arendt’s challenge to reconsider “the human condition from the 
vantage point of our newest experiences and most recent fears” (Arendt 1958) as 
was suggested in the background note to the ONLIFE Initiative. A core experience 
in our contemporary socio-technical lifeworld—often resulting in fear—concerns 
responsibility and accountability: namely, the difficulty to attribute responsibility 
and to locate accountability in ever more distributed and entangled socio-technical 
systems. Think small: about the difficulties of finding and reaching the person to 
make responsible in case of a non-functioning internet connection? Think big: who 
is responsible—accountable and liable—for the financial crisis?
Computer technology and ICT in particular has deepened and aggravated these 
issues. Think of artificial agents, search engine algorithms, the personal data han-
dling of social networking sites; think of drones, robots in military and health-
care or unmanned vehicles, think of algorithmic trading: who is responsible and 
especially if things go wrong—who is to blame: designers, users, the technolo-
gies or rather the distributed and entangled socio-technical systems? What are 
the normative implications and who is in charge and able to set the regulative 
frameworks?
On the one hand these are issues to be tackled by policy makers: regulations are 
needed for algorithmic trading, for drone deployments, for the design of electronic 
patient record systems—and for an overabundance of constantly emerging new is-
sues related to the attribution or assumption of responsibility in socio-technical en-
vironments. On the other hand, there are actions and decisions to be taken by each 
and every one of us in our daily lives. When meandering on the Web, where can 
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we place trust and where should we be vigilant? How can we and how should we 
assume responsibility ourselves and how can we attribute it to others?
In this contribution I specifically focus on the responsibilities in processes of 
knowing. I argue that concerning these so-called epistemic responsibilities we are 
also facing new challenges in a hyperconnected reality, which require thought and 
action both on a macroscopic level as well as on a microscopic level. While recon-
sidering received notions of responsibility, it is therefore advised to distinguish two 
relevant perspectives:
1) the individualistic perspective, focusing on individuals acting as knowers within 
increasingly complex and dynamic socio-technical epistemic systems. The lead-
ing question here is: what does it mean to be responsible in knowing?
2) the governance perspective, focusing on the question how systems and environ-
ments should be designed so that individuals can act responsibly. The leading 
question here is: what does it take to enable responsibility in knowing?
Clearly, these two perspectives are related. Actors acting within environments shape 
these environments through their action just as much as those with an explicit gov-
ernance mandate are themselves often part of the environments they intend to de-
sign and govern. Nonetheless, the distinction enables fleshing out different tasks 
and duties—different responsibilities—related to either acting within systems or 
designing and governing systems.
2  Knowing Today
Our ways of knowing, be it in research or in everyday-life are on the one hand high-
ly social: much of what we know, we know through the spoken or written words of 
others; research consists not only in collaboration, but also in building upon previ-
ous knowledge, in communicating information, in communal quality assessment of 
scientific agents or content (e.g. peer review), etc. On the other hand, technology, 
particularly information and communication technologies mediate and shape these 
practices of knowing to profound extends. We check Wikipedia to find information 
about a city we plan to visit or some information about a historical incident, we rely 
on search engines to deliver relevant information on a specific topic, we use ratings 
of other agents explicitly to assess the quality of products before buying them or 
implicitly by accepting the ordering of search results or recommendations. Thus, 
contemporary epistemic practices have to be conceived as socio-technical epistemic 
practices.
Within these entangled socio-technical processes of knowing, we rely in nu-
merous more or less transparent ways on other agents, human agents as much as 
non-human agents, infrastructures, technologies. However, what does this mean 
for the two main issues addressed in this paper, i.e. what are the implications of 
this socio-technical epistemic entanglement for (1) being responsible in knowing 
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(individual perspective) and (2) for enabling responsibility in knowing (gover-
nance/design perspective)?
While the former issue is of relevance to each and every one of us, the latter is of 
special concern for policy makers. Particularly interesting cases for the governance 
perspective are the so-called Responsible Research and Innovation initiatives which 
have been proposed by several national research councils in Europe (e.g. in the UK, 
the Netherlands and Norway) as well as by the European Commission.
3  Responsible Research and Innovation
The Responsible Research and Innovation strategy of the European Commission 
is part of the prospective EU Framework Programme Horizon 2020 as a succes-
sor to the Science in Society strand of the current Framework Programme FP7. By 
combining the word responsible with research and innovation as two particularly 
knowledge-intense domains, it could be expected that RRI will deliver at least some 
answers to the before mentioned challenges regarding responsibility—particularly 
epistemic  responsibility—in a hyperconnected era.
So what is RRI about? According to a recent leaflet by the European Commis-
sion: “(r)esponsible Research and Innovation means that societal actors work to-
gether during the whole research and innovation process in order to better align both 
the process and its outcomes, with the values, needs and expectations of European 
society. RRI is an ambitious challenge for the creation of a Research and Innovation 
policy driven by the needs of society and engaging all societal actors via inclusive 
participatory approaches.”1
More specifically, the RRI framework consists of six key areas: (1) engagement, 
(2) gender equality, (3) science education, (4) open access, (5) ethics and (6) gov-
ernance, the last one being an umbrella term for the first 5 areas.2 On the website 
of the European Foundation Center the same first five areas of key relevance for 
RRI are also identified, area (6) on governance, however, is missing while they 
list science communication and career as two additional key areas of RRI. On this 
latter website, each key area is followed by short explanation. For instance, public 
engagement refers to the “engagement of people and civil society organizations 
in the research and innovation process and the integration of society in science is-
sues” and careers to “making careers in science and technology attractive to young 
students”.3
Two observations may be illuminating: First of all, it seems that most of these 
guidelines focus on what may be considered professional ethics or business ethics, 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/responsible-research-
and-innovation-leaflet_en.pdf (Accessed 28 June 2013).
2 http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/responsible-research-
and-innovation-leaflet_en.pdf (Accessed 28 June 2013).
3 http://www.efc.be/news_events/Pages/From-Science-in-Society.aspx (Accessed 28 June 2013).
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i.e. appropriate professional behavior in practices such as hiring or communicat-
ing. What appears rather neglected, in contrast, are the ethical implications of the 
epistemic practices in research and innovation themselves. Second, despite loom-
ing large in the title of the initiative, the term responsibility is surprisingly under-
represented in the descriptions of RRI’s key areas and goals. In the summary on 
the website of the European Foundation Center the word “responsibility” is not 
to be found at all. In the leaflet by the European Commission, it appears at two 
instances: in the section on science education, it is argued that science education 
is needed to “equip future researchers and other societal actors with the necessary 
knowledge and tools to fully participate and take responsibility in the research and 
innovation process”4 while in the section on governance it says that “(p)olicymak-
ers also have a responsibility to prevent harmful or unethical developments in 
research and innovation”.
If RRI shall be of some use to tackle the challenges with respect to epistemic re-
sponsibility in a hyperconnected era, then we need to improve it on two fronts. First, 
we need to add some meat to the notion of responsibility, to fill the term “respon-
sible” in Responsible Research and Innovation with some content. Second, when 
addressing epistemic responsibility in research and innovation, we need to focus on 
the ethics of epistemic practices themselves, i.e. the responsibilities of epistemic 
agents as epistemic agents.
When asking what it may mean to act responsibly as an epistemic agent within 
socio-technically entangled systems, I will become obvious that epistemic respon-
sibility is a topic that links epistemology to ethics. Therefore, we do not merely a 
subsection on ethics in Responsible Research and Innovation: we need to under-
stand and acknowledge—both in epistemic and in political terms—that epistemic 
practices are inherently ethical practices.
In the next sections, I will start addressing some of the challenges we face with 
respect to epistemic responsibility in a hyperconnected era.
4  Approaching Distributed Epistemic Responsibility
There are various research areas that have provided invaluable insights to crucial 
aspects of being responsible in knowing within entangled socio-technical epistemic 
systems. To open up this topic, I will in the following sections briefly introduce 
crucial insights from three different fields of research: research on epistemic re-
sponsibility in (social) epistemology, research on (distributed) moral responsibility 
in philosophy of computing, and research on distributed or entangled responsibility 
in feminist theory.
4 http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/responsible-research-
and-innovation-leaflet_en.pdf (Accessed 28 June 2013).
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4.1  Epistemic Responsibility: Insights from (Social) 
Epistemology
Epistemic responsibility can be understood in terms of the duties of knowers in giv-
ing and accepting reasons. Within analytic epistemology, for instance, it is discussed 
whether and to what extent epistemic responsibility is a condition for epistemic 
justification and knowledge. Some theoreticians focus on very basic questions con-
cerning our duties to revise beliefs in light of new evidence, fundamentally related 
to the topic of doxastic voluntarism, i.e. the question whether we can voluntary con-
trol our beliefs. Others address the question of what being a good informant implies 
(Craig 1990), focus on concepts of epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthi-
ness and relate epistemic responsibility to moral responsibility (Corlett 2008), or 
assess what our responsibilities are in granting authority to sources of information 
(Origgi 2008). While the topic of epistemic responsibility can be addressed with 
respect to different sources of knowledge, such as memory or perception, it is most 
interesting in the context of testimonial knowledge practices, i.e., practices related 
to receiving knowledge through the spoken or written words of others.
In recent years, testimony has emerged as a central topic within social epistemol-
ogy, the philosophical discipline addressing the various ways in which knowledge 
is social. In contrast to the abundance of publications on testimony (e.g. Coady 
1992; Fricker 2007; Adler 1994) and related topics such as epistemic trust (e.g. 
Origgi 2004; Simon 2010), epistemic authority (e.g. Origgi 2008), epistemic injus-
tice (especially Fricker 2007), epistemic responsibility itself has only very recently 
attracted attention within analytic social epistemology.5
Although insights from social epistemology, in particular those addressing epis-
temic practices in more applied settings are highly crucial for a notion of epistemic 
responsibility for the 21st century, there are several shortcomings: First and fore-
most, due to this origin in the debates around the epistemology of testimony, the 
focus of attention in this discourse of epistemic responsibility is also mostly on 
epistemic interactions between human agents, i.e. on the responsibilities of speak-
ers and hearers in testimonial exchanges. Yet, taking into account that processes 
of knowing take place in increasingly entangled systems consisting of human and 
non-human agents, systems in which content from multiple sources gets processed, 
accepted, rejected, modified in various ways by these different agents, the notion 
of epistemic responsibility needs to be modified and expanded to account for such 
socio-technical epistemic processes. Two issues need to be addressed in more detail 
than is currently the case in most analytic accounts of epistemic responsibility: (a) 
the role of technology and (b) the relationship between power and knowledge.6 To 
5 Confer for instance the conference on “Social Epistemology and Epistemic Responsibility”, 
which took place at Kings College in May 2012. http://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/philosophy/
events/kclunc2012.aspx (Accessed 18 September 2013).
6 It would be inadequate to argue that the role of technology or the role of power have been entirely 
neglected in social epistemology. On the one hand, there have been attempts to account for ICT 
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put technology in general and ICT in particular into the equation, we should turn to 
philosophy of technology and philosophy of computing. Regarding the relationship 
between power, knowledge and technology, it has been feminist theoreticians in 
particular who have provided highly valuable insights. Thoughts from both fields 
will be briefly introduced in the next two sections.
4.2  Responsibility & ICT: Insights from the Philosophy  
of Computing
The complexity and entanglement of social and technical compounds in many digi-
tal systems has lead to difficulties in locating agency, accountability and respon-
sibility, which various philosophers of computing and computer ethicists aim to 
tackle. Unsurprisingly, there is a growing amount of research on moral and legal 
responsibility in computing (cf. Coleman 2004), specific foci being autonomous 
agents (e.g. Coeckelbergh 2009) and robotics (e.g. Pagallo 2010). With respect to 
accountability, Nissenbaum’s (1997) paper on accountability in a computerized so-
ciety is surely an early seminal piece, in which different causes for contemporary 
difficulties in accountability attribution are already worked out: the problem of 
many hands, the problem of bugs, using the computer as a scapegoat, and owner-
ship without liability.
Of particular importance for the goals of this paper are Floridi and Sander’s 
(2004) early considerations on the morality of artificial agents as well as Floridi’s 
more recent analyses regarding distributed morality (Floridi 2012). According to 
Floridi and Sanders (2004) something qualifies as an agent if it shows interactivity, 
autonomy and adaptability, i.e. neither free will nor intentions are deemed neces-
sary for agency. Such a concept of “mind-less morality” (Floridi and Sander 2004, 
p. 349) allows addressing the agency of artificial entities (such as algorithms) as 
well as of collectives, which may form entities of their own (such as companies or 
organizations). Another merit of their approach lies in the disentanglement of moral 
agency and moral responsibility: a non-human entity can be held accountable if it 
qualifies as an agent, i.e. if it acts autonomously, interactively and adaptively. How-
ever, it cannot be held responsible, because responsibility requires intentionality. 
That is, while agency and accountability do not require intentionality, responsibility 
does. Therefore, it seems that non-human agents—as long as they a) do not exhibit 
intentionality and b) are considered in separation—cannot be held responsible even 
if they are accountable for certain actions.
(e.g. some works by Alvin Goldman (2008) and Don Fallis (2006), the special issue of the journal 
EPISTEME (2009, volume 6, issue 1, on Wikipedia). Moreover, Fricker’s book on “Epistemic 
Injustice” (2007) has also stirred a lot of interest in the relationship between power and knowledge. 
However, these developments are rather recent and the classical assessment of testimonial process-
es remains focused on communication between humans often still conceived as an unconditioned 
and a-social subject S, who knows that p.
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While these considerations on responsibility and accountability in socio-techni-
cal systems are highly developed, the specific problem of epistemic responsibility 
in ICT has not yet been in the focus of attention within philosophy of computing. 
Hence, it appears worthwhile to take the best from both fields of research to develop 
a sound notion of epistemic responsibility within entangled socio-technical epis-
temic environments. Yet, instead of starting from scratch taking a look at feminist 
theory proves highly illuminating, because different feminist theoreticians have not 
only focused on the responsibilities of knowers in complex environments. They 
have also emphasized the important relationship between knowledge and power.
4.3  Epistemic Responsibility in Entangled Socio-Technical 
Systems: Insights from Feminist Theory
Despite the fact that epistemic responsibility has only very recently attracted atten-
tion within analytic epistemology, the term itself has already been used in 1987 as 
the title of a book by Lorraine Code (Code 1987). In this book, Code addresses the 
concepts of responsibility and accountability from a decidedly feminist perspec-
tive and argues that in understanding epistemic processes in general and epistemic 
responsibility and accountability in particular; we need to relate epistemology to 
ethics. Criticizing the unconditioned subject S who knows that p, “the abstract, 
interchangeable individual, whose monologues have been spoken from nowhere, 
in particular, to an audience of faceless and usually disembodied onlookers” (Code 
1995, p. xiv), Code emphasizes social, i.e. cooperative and interactive aspects of 
knowing as well as the related “complicity in structures of power and privilege” 
(Code 1995, p. xiv), “the linkages between power and knowledge, and between 
stereotyping and testimonial authority” (Code 1995, p. xv).
While Code’s work highlights the relationship between knowledge and power, 
research by Karen Barad and Lucy Suchman adds technology to the equation and 
therefore appears particularly suited to explore the notion of epistemic responsibil-
ity within entangled and distributed socio-technical systems:
Barad’s “agential realism” (Barad 1996; Barad 2007) delivers an “[…] epistemo-
logical-ontological-ethical framework that provides an understanding of the role of 
human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and natural and cultural factors in 
scientific and other social-material practices” (Barad 2007, p. 26).
Barad’s approach is theoretically based upon Niels Bohr’s unmaking of the Car-
tesian dualism of object and subject, i.e. on the claim that within the process of 
physical measurement, the object and the observer, Barad’s “agencies of obser-
vation”, get constituted by and within the observation process itself and are not 
pre-defined entities. The results of measurements are thus neither fully constituted 
by any reality that is independent of its observation, nor by the methods or agents 
of observation alone. Rather, all of them, the observed, the observer and the prac-
tices, methods and instruments of observation are entangled in the process of what 
we call “reality”. For Barad, reality itself is nothing pre-defined, but something 
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that develops and changes through epistemic practices, through the interactions of 
objects and agents of observation in the process of observation and measurement. 
Reality in this sense is a verb and not a noun.
Yet, interaction is a problematic term in so far as it presupposes two separate 
entities to interact. Thus, to avoid this presupposed dualism, she introduces the ne-
ologism of “intra-action”, to denote the processes taking place within the object-
observer-compound, the entanglement of object and observer in the process of 
observation. This terminological innovation is meant to discursively challenge the 
prevalent dualisms of subject-object, nature-culture, human-technology, and aims at 
opening up alternative, non-dichotomous understandings of technoscientific prac-
tices.
A crucial concern of Barad is the revaluation of matter. Opposing the excessive 
focus on discourse in some other feminist theories, Barad emphasizes the relevance 
of matter and the materiality of our worlds. Taking matter serious and describing it 
as active, means to allow for non-human or hybrid forms of agency, a step that has 
been taken already with the principle of generalized symmetry in Actor-Network-
Theory. Yet, if we attribute agency to non-human entities, can and should they be 
held responsible and accountable? Plus, isn’t that an invitation, a carte blanche to 
shirk responsibility by humans? Do we let ourselves off the hook too easily and 
throw away any hopes for responsible and accountable actions?
It appears that Barad’s view on non-human agency and her stance towards the 
ontological symmetry between humans and non-humans has changed from earlier 
articulations (Barad 1996) to later ones (Barad 2007). In 1996, she still underscores 
the human role in representing, by stating that “[n]ature has agency, but it does not 
speak itself to the patient, unobtrusive observer listening for its cries—there is an 
important asymmetry with respect to agency: we do the representing and yet nature 
is not a passive blank slate awaiting our inscriptions, and to privilege the material 
or discursive is to forget the inseparability that characterizes phenomena” (Barad 
1996, p. 181).
However, it seems that this special treatment of humans and especially the notion 
of representing does not well match her posthumanist performativity, as depicted 
some years later (Barad 2003). Finally, in “Meeting the Universe Halfway” Barad 
offers a more nuanced dissolution of the distinction between human and non-human 
agency. By stating that “[a]gency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not 
something that someone or something has” (Barad 2007, p. 261), Barad moves the 
locus of agency from singular entities to entangled material-discursive apparatuses. 
But even if agency is not tied to individual entities, it is bound with responsibil-
ity and accountability, as Barad makes very explicit: “Learning how to intra-act 
responsibly within and as part of the world means understanding that we are not 
the only active beings—though this is never justification for deflecting that respon-
sibility onto other entities. The acknowledgment of “nonhuman agency” does not 
lessen human accountability; on the contrary, it means that accountability requires 
that much more attentiveness to existing power asymmetries (Barad 2007, p. 218 f).
Thus, the possibility to understand agency not essentialist as a (human) charac-
teristic, but as something which is rather attributed to certain phenomena within 
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entangled networks could be regarded as an invitation to shirk of responsibility. 
But this is clearly not the aim of Barad. When developing her posthumanist eth-
ics, Barad concludes that even if we are not the only ones who are or can be held 
responsible, our responsibility is even greater than it would be if it were ours alone. 
She states: “We (but not only “we humans”) are always already responsible to the 
others with whom or which we are entangled, not through conscious intent but 
through the various ontological entanglements that materiality entails. What is on 
the other side of the agential cut is not separate from us—agential separability is not 
individuation. Ethics is therefore not about right response to a radically exterio/ized 
(sic!) other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities 
of becoming of which we are a part” (Barad 2007, p. 393).
This focus on responsibility and accountability relates back to Barad’s initial 
framing of agential realism as an “epistemological-ontological-ethical framework”, 
a term by which she stresses the “[…] fundamental inseparability of epistemologi-
cal, ontological, and ethical considerations” (Barad 2007, p. 26). Barad insists that 
we are responsible for what we know, and—as a consequence of her onto-episte-
mology for what is (Barad 2003, p.  829). Accountability and responsibility must be 
thought of in terms of what matters and what is excluded from mattering, what is 
known and what is not, what is and what is not.
This acknowledgement that knowledge always implies responsibility, not only 
renders issues of ethics and politics of such knowledge- and reality-creating pro-
cesses indispensable. It also relates directly back to Barad’s emphasis on performa-
tivity: epistemic practices are productive and different practices produce different 
phenomena. If our practices of knowing do not merely represent what is there, but 
shape and create what is and what will be there, talking about the extent to which 
knowledge is power or entails responsibility gets a whole different flavor.
Lucy Suchman shares many concerns of Karen Barad and her insights promise 
to be of particular importance for considerations regarding computationally medi-
ated environments due to Suchman’s background in Human-Computer Interaction. 
Acknowledging the relational and entangled nature of the sociomaterial, Suchman 
claims that agency cannot be localized in individual entities, but rather is distributed 
within socio-material assemblages. Resonating with Barad, she notes “[…] agen-
cies—and associated accountabilities—reside neither in us nor in our artifacts but 
in our intra-actions” (Suchman 2009, p. 285).
The question, however, remains how exactly to be responsible, how to hold or 
to be held accountable if agency is distributed. How can we maintain responsibility 
and accountability in such a networked, dynamic and relational matrix? Although 
I think that Suchman goes into the right direction, she remains quite vague about 
this in her concluding remarks of Human-Machine-Reconfigurations by stating that 
“responsibility on that view is met neither through control nor abdication but in on-
going practical, critical, and generative acts of engagement. The point in the end is 
not to assign agency either to persons or to things but to identify the materialization 
of subjects, objects, and the relations between them as an effect, more and less du-
rable and contestable, of ongoing sociomaterial practices” (Suchman 2009, p. 285).
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5  Facing Distributed Epistemic Responsibility
To understand the epistemic responsibilities of knowers in our contemporary, hy-
perconnected world, I think all insights outlined above need to be accounted for. Yet 
it still has to be explored and discussed in detail a) whether, how and to what extent 
they can be aligned and b) what the implications both on an individual and a gover-
nance level could or should be. That means that we need conceptual advancements 
as well as practical solutions and guidance both for individuals and policy makers. 
Before I turn to both tasks, let me recapitulate the challenges regarding epistemic 
responsibility in our hyperconnected era.
As knowers we move and act within highly entangled socio-technical epistemic 
systems. In our attempts to know, we permanently need to decide when and whom 
to trust and when to withhold trust, when to remain vigilant. Loci of trust in these 
entangled and highly complex environments are not only other humans, but also 
technologies, companies, or organizations—and they usually cannot be conceived 
in separation but only as socio-technical compounds. This holds true for our daily 
life, imagine just the case of someone booking a flight online. It holds even more 
true for scientific environments, where information acquisition and processing in-
volve various hyperconnected agents and institutions.
Socio-technical epistemic systems are highly entangled but also highly differen-
tiated systems consisting of human, non-human and compound or collective entities 
each equipped with very different amounts of power. To understand this, search 
engines are a useful example. In highly simplified terms, search engines can be con-
ceived as code written, run and used by human and non-human agents embedded in 
socio-technical infrastructures as well as in organizational, economic, societal and 
political environments. While there are potentially many ways to enter the World 
Wide Web, search engines have emerged as major points of entrance and specific 
search engines nowadays function as “obligatory passage points” (Callon 1986), 
exerting tremendous amount of not only economic, but also epistemic power.
That is to say that the fact that both human and non-human entities can qualify 
as agents does not imply that we have entered a state of harmony and equality: there 
are enormous differences in power between different agents. To use Barad’s termi-
nology, some agents matter much more than others. And—for better or worse—
those that matter most do not necessarily have to be human agents.
In Actor-Network-Theory (e.g. Latour 1992; Law and Hassard 1999), power is 
conceived as a network effect—a view that is highly plausible and useful in the con-
text of search engines, recommender systems or social networking sites, because 
the power of specific search engines does not stem from any a priori advantage, 
but rather is the result of collective socio-technical epistemic practices in which we 
all are involved: it is our practices of knowing, of relying on and using information 
which influence and shape the power distributions in our environment.
It is in these sociotechnical, hyperconnected and entangled systems, that the no-
tion of epistemic responsibility is becoming a key challenge for both policy makers 
and us as individual epistemic agents processing information in research just as 
much as in our every-day lives.
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5.1  Re-Conceptualizing Epistemic Responsibility
Responsibility is a rich concept, a concept with many nuances, a noun that changes 
its meaning if coupled with different verbs. There is a difference between being re-
sponsible and taking responsibility: we can be responsible for something, but deny 
assuming responsibility for it. This temptation to shirk responsibility is probably as 
old as humankind and has lead to sophisticated techniques in cutting down chains 
of responsibilities in law or the insurance sector. On the other hand, we may also ac-
cept the full responsibility for something, even if we are not, or at least only partial-
ly responsible. If a minister steps back, because of some misconduct in her ministry 
she has not even been aware of, she takes responsibility, she responds. Moreover, 
responsibility can be assumed oneself as well as attributed to someone else.
All these different meanings of responsibility and their intersections are crucial 
for understanding what it takes to be epistemically responsible in socio-technical 
environments consisting of human and non-human agents. For instance, before 
asking for criteria of how exactly responsibility can be assumed or attributed and 
further how it should be assumed or attributed, we may start by asking these two 
related but distinctive basic questions that are of increasing relevance in our compu-
tational age: (1) Can epistemic responsibility be assumed only by human agents or 
also by other agents? (2) Can epistemic responsibility be attributed to only human 
or also non-human agents?
As a first step to apprehend these questions, I suggest disentangling the notions 
of agency, accountability and responsibility more carefully. Both Barad and Such-
man seem to use the terms responsibility and accountability interchangeably. How-
ever, taking some philosophical insights into account, it seems fruitful to maintain 
a distinction between these two notions. As noted before, for Floridi and Sanders 
(2004), agency requires interactivity, autonomy and adaptivity, but no intentionality 
is needed. Accountability is bound to agency only and hence also does not require 
intentionality of agents. However, responsibility differs from accountability exactly 
by requiring intentionality. Hence, if we agree with Floridi and Sanders (2004) that 
responsibility as opposed to agency and accountability requires intentionality, then 
it makes no sense to talk about responsibility with respect to technical artifacts. A 
car cannot be made responsible for a crash, it is the driver who is to blame—for 
negligence or ill-will—or maybe the manufacturer, if a technical flaw caused the 
crash. If an unmanned vehicle that drives autonomously, interactively and adap-
tively caused a crash, this car may be accountable for a crash, but it cannot be held 
responsible. Please note that it is only the technical artifact in isolation, which can-
not be made responsible. For socio-technical compounds, the possibility of attribut-
ing responsibility would still be given, hence this perspective may in the end well 
be compatible with Barad’s agential realism (Barad 2007).
To my mind, the distinction between accountability and responsibility is cru-
cial and I think we need a strong concept of responsibility reserved for intentional 
agents to really account for Barad’s insights regarding the entanglement between 
(a) the social, the technical and the epistemic, as well as (b) between epistemology, 
ontology and ethics. Reconsider the core distinction between being responsible and 
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taking responsibility: while Barad rightly stresses our interdependences (or rather 
intradependences), the entanglement of human and non-human agents in knowing, 
being and doing, the process of assuming responsibility is and remains an inten-
tional act.
For epistemic responsibility this means that as responsible epistemic agents, we 
intentionally assume responsibility for what we claim to know. In full awareness of 
our socio-technical epistemic entanglement, we accept to be challenged for what 
we claim to know, we commit ourselves to provide evidence for our claims and to 
revise our beliefs in the light of new evidence. Hence, to understand and improve 
our processes of knowing, to be responsible knowers as individuals, we first need to 
acknowledge both the deep entanglements between the social, the technical and the 
epistemic as well as between epistemology, ethics and ontology. However, the only 
adequate reaction to this awareness must be to assume responsibility as an inten-
tional act. It is only we humans (so far?) that can take this stance, hence it is our duty 
to assume responsibility for our interrelated ways of knowing, being and doing.
However, what is also clear is that the ease with which epistemic responsibility 
can be assumed differs between different socio-technical environments: in some 
environments assuming responsibility for what one knows is rather easy, in others 
it is much more difficult. Access to various types of evidence, to supporting or con-
tradicting information is essential to become epistemically responsible in knowing. 
It is in this sense that supporting open access is a very important and valid aspect of 
Responsible Research and Innovation. More generally it means that our individual 
efforts must be complemented with appropriate policies that support environments 
in which epistemic responsibility assumption is enabled, fostered and incentivized.
5.2  Governance for Epistemic Responsibility
Based upon conceptual work regarding the basic meaning of concepts such as re-
sponsibility, accountability, action or intentionality, we need to come up with practi-
cal solutions to support responsibility assumption and attribution in our hypercon-
nected reality from a governance perspective. We need to develop policy frame-
works that enable and support epistemically responsible behaviour.
How would such frameworks to be conceptualized? Take the example, I have 
given before, Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), which is clearly meant 
to offer guidance for designing and governing environments that elicit and support 
responsible epistemic practices. Yet despite its name, Responsible Research and 
Innovation, as currently conceived, cannot fulfill these tasks properly because it 
fails tackling important challenges worked out in this contribution, namely a) to 
properly acknowledge the socio-technical entanglement of knowers, b) to properly 
acknowledge the interdependency of epistemical, ontological and ethical aspects of 
science, c) to support responsibility assumption and attribution and d) to be atten-
tive to power asymmetries within entangled socio-technical environments.
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Hence, in order to really enable and support epistemic responsibility it would 
be essential to revise and amend current the RRI guidelines by adding new guiding 
thoughts such as the following:
1. Acknowledge the interrelation of epistemology, ethics and ontology: knowing, 
doing and being are interrelated, i.e. our processes of knowing have effects on 
what can be done and what we are—and vice versa.
2. Keep in mind the deep socio-technical entanglement of contemporary epistemic 
practices: Within our practices of knowing, we depend upon other human and 
non-human agents just as much as these other agents depend on us.
3. Bear in mind that epistemic relations are power relations: Within socio-techni-
cal epistemic systems, different epistemic agents, human as well as non-human 
agents, such as algorithms, are equipped with different amounts of power.
4. … etc
Thus, if revised appropriately, RRI could provide guidance on how to act respon-
sibly in research and innovation as particularly knowledge-intense domains. Yet 
epistemic practices exist beyond research and governance supporting epistemic re-
sponsibility accordingly has to be expanded beyond advice or regulations regarding 
research and innovation. Each and every one of us has to assume epistemic respon-
sibility for the things we claim to know in our everyday life as well. When and 
whom should we trust to know about climate change, about the war on terrorism or 
just about the latest unemployment numbers? How vigilant do we have to be when 
accepting information received from various on- and offline sources?
While these are challenges that we all face on a daily basis, they also pose chal-
lenges for the governance of socio-technical epistemic systems. In a computational 
age characterized by ever more powerful personalization and profiling techniques 
assuming epistemic responsibility becomes much harder, because we may neither 
be able to decide which information we receive nor which information is received 
about us. After all, how can we be responsible knowers if we cannot assess how 
trustworthy our sources of knowledge are?
Without denying the utility of personalized services, in order to act epistemi-
cally responsible in an age of extensive profiling and personalization, we need the 
possibility to access, understand and to even trick the systems which are accessing, 
understanding and potentially tricking us. As Mireille Hildebrandt stresses in her 
contribution, we need to develop “first (…) human machine interfaces that give 
us unobtrusive intuitive access to how we are being profiled, and, second, a new 
hermeneutics that allows us to trace at the technical level how the algorithms can 
be ‘read’ and contested” (Hildebrandt 2013). We need policies addressing more 
broadly the challenges related to distributed epistemic responsibility in a hypercon-
nected reality, policies to set the parameters for an environment where individuals 
can act responsibly, i.e. where they can both assume and attribute responsibility 
even if they are deeply socio-technically entangled.
To conclude: in the long run, it will be essential to develop a concept of epis-
temic responsibility that can account for the responsibilities of various differently 
empowered agents within entangled socio-technical epistemic systems. Moreover, 
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we will need to develop policy frameworks that provide guidance both for the indi-
vidual seeking to act responsibly in knowing and for the design and governance of 
environments that support epistemically responsible behaviour. In addition to the 
goals that Pagallo has described for his notion of “good enough Onlife governance” 
(Pagallo 2013), these frameworks should entail support for individuals (e.g. educa-
tion and support of digital literacy) as well as incentives for the research and design 
of epistemically beneficial systems (e.g. transparency-by-design, research on better 
interface design, development of tools for argumentation extraction and visualiza-
tion, etc.).7
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